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ABSTRACT: The word 'logic' is conceptualized differently by logicians and by intercultural communication scholars
and scholars of English as a second or foreign language (TESOL/TEFL scholars). Logicians emphasize the
normative aspect of logic, whereas TESOL/TEFL scholars and intercultural communication scholars emphasize the
linguistically relativistic aspect of logic. This paper lays out different senses of logic and attempts to examine how
these different senses affect the theory of argument and argumentation, focusing on the theory of analysis and the
theory of evaluation.
KEYWORDS: logic, logicians, communication theorists, TESOL/TEFL scholars

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an attempt to lay out several issues for constructing general theories of argument
and argumentation. If I may borrow Toulmin's famous terminology of ‘field-dependent’ and
‘field-invariant’ (1958, p. 15) and apply it to language, I can call these issues of
language-dependence and language-invariance1. In order to offer a clear map for us to refer to in
future research, I focus on two different senses of the word 'logic' and see what implications I can
draw from each of the senses. At the end of this paper, several issues to be examined by scholars
of argument and argumentation should emerge. In the next section, I attempt to describe two
different senses of logic offered by three groups of scholars: logicians, TESOL/TEFL scholars,
and intercultural communication scholars. In the third section, I will illustrate how the differences
in the meaning of logic can impact theories of argument and argumentation, in terms of analysis
and evaluation. The fourth section of this paper is the conclusion.

1

Since some scholars of argument and argumentation seem to assume that existing theories of argument and
argumentation are deeply rooted in mainstream Euro-American socio-cultural practice, they question if the existing
theories are adequate for analyzing, evaluating, and critiquing argument and argumentation that occur in different
societies and cultures. In a question and answering session following Frans van Eemeren's keynote address at the 2nd
Tokyo Conference on Argumentation in August 2004, I heard Gordon Mitchell of the University of Pittsburgh
question whether the Pragma-Dialectical model of argumentation would apply in evaluating argumentative discourse
in different socio-cultural forums. Van Eemeren answered that the Pragma-Dialectical model would apply, for people
in different cultures may appear to argue differently but they still use reason, on which the Pragma-Dialectical model
can shed light. Although I personally buy into van Eemeren's position on this point, I believe that theorists of
argument and argumentation must consider Mitchell's point more seriously if they want to claim generality for their
own theories of argument and argumentation.
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2. SENSES OF LOGIC
In this part of the paper, I will describe how logicians 2 and TESOL/TEFL scholars and
communication scholars conceive of logic. Although I do not intend to state by any means that
the present review of literature is exhaustive and comprehensive, it will illuminate different
senses of logic.
2.1. Copi and Cohen's Conception
Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen conceive of logic as the study of the normative aspects of
evaluating argument3, the product of reasoning. They define logic as ‘the study of the methods
and principles used to distinguish correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning’ (1998, p. 3). As is
clear from this definition, they emphasize the normative aspect of reasoning. According to this
definition, people can learn how to judge good and bad reasoning through logic.
In addition to this definition, Copi and Cohen set two further limits to the scope of logic
(1998, p. 4). First, logic concerns the product of reasoning, not its process. It is psychologists
rather than logicians who are interested in the process of reasoning. Based upon this limitation,
they offer texts or symbols, both of which are products, for readers as exercises. Second, they
state that logic is not ‘the science of the laws of thought,’ for some types of thinking are not
reasoning. Their point is that studying logic is not equal to studying thinking. Therefore, some
types of thinking not covered by reasoning become the focal point of academic inquiries other
than logic.
2.2. Johnson's Conception
Although Ralph Johnson agrees with Copi and Cohen that logic concerns the normative aspects
of reasoning, he further classifies logic into formal logic and informal logic. In his view, both
formal logic and informal logic study ‘different types of reasoning’ (1996, p. 194). The former
studies inference, implication, and/or entailment4, whereas the latter studies ‘a normative theory
of criticism for argumentation’, the purpose of which is rational persuasion (1996, p. 111).
Regardless of the types of reasoning covered by different logics, he still sees that logic helps
people adequately evaluate reasoning. Based upon his conception of informal logic, he and J. A.
Blair co-authored Logical Self-Defense, in which they treat how to evaluate arguments in natural
language with relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability criteria (1994).
2.3. Govier's Conception
Trudy Govier conceives of the primary task of logic as ‘the appraisal of inferences’ (1987, p. 209).
In this respect, she is similar to Copi and Cohen and Johnson, for she emphasizes the normative
aspects of reasoning with this conception. Like Johnson, she further classifies logic into formal
2

I regard Copi and Cohen as formal logicians, and Johnson and Govier as informal logicians.
Although it is not the focus of this paper, suffice it to say that what Copi and Cohen mean by argument is broader
than what many theorists of argument and argumentation mean by the same word.
4
Johnson does not delineate distinctions among inference, implication, and entailment in Johnson (1996). However,
since one of his main theses in the book is to differentiate informal logic from formal logic, his thesis stands as
cogent as long as the focus of informal logic is argument(ation).
3
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logic and informal logic and emphasizes that argument evaluation requires judgment that formal
rules cannot fully cover.
2.4. Kaplan's Conception
Robert Kaplan advances the point that logic is ‘a cultural phenomenon’ drawing on sociologists
and anthropologists (1972, p. 246). Here, he does not use the word 'logic' as the study of norms of
reasoning as conceptualized by logicians. He states:
Logic (in the popular sense, rather than the logician's sense of the world) which is the basis of rhetoric, is
evolved out of a culture; it is not universal. Rhetoric, then is not universal either, but varies from culture to
culture and even from time to time within a given culture. (1972, p. 246)

If logic is not the study of norms of reasoning, then what is it? It is clear from this quotation that
logic is a source of rhetoric. However, since it is not clear from his remark what he means exactly
by the popular sense of logic, we must make a guess about his intention.
From his remarks, I assume that by logic he means something like thought patterns. This
sense of logic is offered in the Collins Cobuild Resource Pack. The third entry of the definition of
logic states: ‘A particular kind of logic is the way of thinking and reasoning about things that is
characteristic of a particular type of person or particular field of activity’ (2003, emphasis in
original). Logic for Kaplan seems to mean a thought pattern of particular language users. When
he talks about a language and its thought patterns, he states that non-native English speakers'
writing often does not have a clear focus ‘because the foreign student is employing a rhetoric and
a sequence of thought which violate the expectations of the native reader’ (1972, p. 247).
According to him, native English speakers expect inductive and deductive reasoning when they
read expository paragraphs. Both reasoning patterns are linear and non-digressive. He implies
that if a thought pattern or sequence of thought (logic) is non-digressive in a particular language,
then a linguistic or rhetorical pattern tends to be non-digressive as well. He relies on Paul
Lorenzen to advance this thesis by saying that ‘certain linguistic structures are best
comprehended as embodiments of logical structure’ (1972, pp. 247-248). In other words, logic is
a source from which a linguistic/rhetorical pattern is derived. He does not pinpoint what logic is
in a particular language. However, the logic of a particular language influences its product, i.e.,
its written prose. Based on this notion of logic and rhetoric, Kaplan states that five different
language groups—English, Semitic, Oriental5, Romance, and Russian—produce five different
paragraph patterns6.
Kaplan's contrastive rhetoric, based on logic as a thought pattern, has been influential in the
field of TESOL/TEFL. For example, John Hinds (1983) analyzed the expository writing of
entries in a Japanese newspaper column. Also, Kyoko Oi (1999) expanded types of writing from
expository writing to argumentative writing and analyzed a sequence of thought that frequently
emerges in Japanese students learning English.
2.5. Okabe's Conception

5

According to Kaplan's classification, Oriental is Chinese and Korean, but not Japanese (1972, p. 252).
Kaplan himself does not believe that his point is conclusive and calls for further research before we can draw any
meaningful conclusion (1972, p. 257). I agree on this point and regard his position on contrastive rhetoric as more
conjectural or hypothetical than conclusive.
6
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Roichi Okabe, one of the leading communication scholars in Japan, uses such words as logic,
logical, and logicality to refer to two different entities. He is in one respect similar to Kaplan, and
in another respect similar to logicians. He takes a similar position to Kaplan's in that logic is
connected to thought patterns. In his contrastive analysis of Japanese and American cultural
assumptions, he devotes a section to thought patterns and examines ‘the logicality’ of the English
language and the Japanese language. According to him, the English language employs line
thinking, so ‘the logical route’ is clear to the listener. In contrast, the Japanese language employs
point or space thinking, so the listener must supply what is unsaid (1983, pp. 28-29). Although he
does not quote or refer to Kaplan's article, Okabe has a similar idea of logic, the thought patterns
of the English language.
In addition, Okabe seems to believe, like Kaplan, that a pattern of thinking in a specific
language influences the product (discourse). When he talks about the organizing of a discourse,
he again introduces the notion of a chainlike organization of discourse by English language users
and of a pointlike organization of discourse by Japanese language users. These two similarities to
Kaplan suggest that Okabe endorses an idea that logic is a thought pattern which affects the
product.
Okabe's use of the word logic is not limited to logic as a thought pattern. He also uses it
like logicians. When he talks about the functions of rhetoric, he says that American rhetoric is
‘basically argumentative and logical in nature,’ while Japanese rhetoric is ‘a means of
disseminating information or of seeking consensus’ (1983, pp. 37-38). Here, ‘logical’ means
something like reasoning, reason-led, or reason-oriented, which is similar to the logicians' use of
the word logic.
2.6. Summary
Formal logicians and informal logicians seem to agree that the word logic concerns the normative
aspects of human reasoning. Reasoning can be different types: inference, implication, entailment,
or argumentation. Whatever type of reasoning it is, logic helps people assess it. This sense of
logic is endorsed by the Oxford Dictionary of English, which defines logic as ‘[t]he branch of
philosophy that treats of the forms of thinking in general, and more especially of inference and of
scientific method’ (2004). At the level of introductory textbooks, formal logicians offer exercises
written in unambiguous symbols and in natural language, whereas informal logicians offer
exercises in ambiguous natural language. Informal logicians sometimes deal with extended
argument, but in most cases those exercises in logic are in short passages or in collections of
short sentences.
Kaplan's use of the word logic suggests that he means something like thought patterns or a
sequence of thought, which affects the linguistic product (expository writing and argumentative
writing). This thought pattern varies from one language to another, so logic is a
language-dependent construct according to this sense.
Okabe uses both senses of logic. He endorses logic as thought patterns and states that the
English language and the Japanese language respectively employ different logics. He also
endorses logic as reasoning when he talks about the functions of rhetoric. In conclusion, although
scholars from three disciplines use the same word, they refer to different entities. Logicians refer
to a sub-field in philosophy that studies the normative aspects of human reasoning. TESOL/TEFL
scholars refer to thought patterns characteristic of a particular group of people. Okabe, a
communication scholar, refers to both the normative aspects of human reasoning and the thought
patterns of a particular group of people.
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3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF ARGUMENT AND ARGUMENTATION
The previous section has revealed two senses of logic: logic as the study of norms of reasoning,
and logic as thought patterns. In this section of the paper, I will turn to a key point: How do these
different senses of logic impact the theory of argument and argumentation? Following Johnson's
classification (2000, pp. 40-41), I attempt to offer implications for the theory of analysis and the
theory of evaluation.
3.1. Theory of Analysis
Arguments can have different appearances even when they consist of the same claim and the
same set of supporting reasons. For example, two arguers who advance a thesis against capital
punishment based on the atrocity of the punishment and the lack of deterrence can organize and
present their own arguments differently. If Kaplan and Okabe are right in their assumption about
different thought patterns and linguistic differences, people with different native languages are
more likely to construct and present arguments differently than people within the same native
language. This would mean that, when we analyze arguments, we might expect a different flow
of reasoning when arguers come from different linguistic communities. If we have better
sensitivity to how an arguer is likely to develop his or her thesis, and to what types of support she
or he is likely to use, then we are more likely to use more efficiently and adequately such analytic
tools for extracting key components as tree diagrams or outlining.
Although Kaplan focused on expository writing, not on argument, and Okabe focused on
rhetorical discourse, which is not exhausted by argument, Oi's research suggests that their points
on thought patterns and linguistic products may apply to argument (1999). In her contrastive
analysis of argumentative essays written by Japanese and American students, Oi has
demonstrated that Japanese people tend to shift positions in the essay, without defending any of
the positions presented in it7. Since an argument like this does not have a conclusion, receivers of
the argument may have difficulty in laying out its structure. However, if they know the tendencies
of Japanese writers in composing an argumentative essay, they are better prepared to analyze the
product. In other words, knowledge of the linguistic background of the arguer may help the
receiver analyze and reconstruct the argument more easily. If Oi's point about argumentative
essays can be generalized, then the generalized point would greatly influence theories on the
analysis of extended arguments offered in Kahane (1976), Johnson and Blair (1994), and Govier
(2001), for an argumentative essay, as its name suggests, is an extended piece of writing in which
arguers develop their arguments8.
3.2. Theory of Evaluation
Logicians have offered several approaches to evaluate arguments. Copi and Cohen take a
traditional position that arguments can be evaluated with deductive and inductive standards (1998,
pp. 24-33). Govier doubts that these two types of arguments are exhaustive and advances a
7

This is similar to what Govier calls conductive arguments (1987, pp. 55-80). Oi's point is that Japanese students
consider the pros and cons of an issue but do not defend either of the two after laying out reasons for consideration.
Because of the lack of a clear stance by the arguer, we can regard such an argument as a bad conductive argument.
8
Oi uses the Toulmin model for analyzing argument structure. She states that it helps Japanese people compose
academic English (1999, p. 99).
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position that logical analogies and conductive arguments should also be considered to adequately
evaluate arguments in natural language9 (1987, pp. 55-80). Johnson and Blair have rejected the
deduction-induction typology and make a case that arguments can be evaluated according to the
triad of relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability10 (1994, pp. 49-60). Whatever standards they
use, these logicians seem to assume that their standards are general and apply to argument across
situations. In other words, these standards are offered as field-invariant.
Given that people from different linguistic communities have different thought patterns and
tend to develop key points differently, can the above standards adequately evaluate the
effectiveness of arguments to get the point across? They can account for the logical cogency of an
argument but may not be able to fully account for the overall quality of the argument, if we take a
language-dependent approach. Two arguments whose claim and support are the same can be
evaluated differently by a single receiver when developed differently. If an argument violates the
receiver's expectation about how the main thesis should be developed, it may not be so persuasive.
As a result, although the logical core of the two arguments is the same, one argument can be
judged to be better than the other. Alternatively, one and the same argument can be evaluated
differently by two receivers who belong to different linguistic communities, for differences in
native language can be a source of different expectations about the good development of an
argument. Either of these cases suggests that the above evaluative standards may not be
language-invariant.
If evaluation of arguments is language-dependent, the previous paragraph only offers one
version: An argument cannot be fully evaluated if an arguer and a receiver do not share the same
native language. This may be a mild version of the language-dependence approach. One can take
a different and extreme position and say that arguments can never be evaluated if thought patterns
are different. Whichever the case, logicians' standards for argument evaluation do not fairly
account for the overall quality of arguments.
4. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, I have investigated two senses of logic and examined how these different senses can
affect the theory of analysis and the theory of evaluation. The following conclusions can be
drawn:
1. Logic can mean both the normative study of reasoning and thought patterns. Since these
two senses of logic refer to different entities, we should be careful not to confuse these two
senses.
2. Logic as thought patterns can vary from one language to another, so the ordering of
extended argument can also vary from one language to another.
3. People from different language communities may have different expectations about how
a thesis should be developed, so the standards to evaluate the cogency of arguments may
not be capable of evaluating the overall quality of the arguments.
I argue that points 2 and 3 above require further inquiry. Researchers interested in language
9

In her textbook, Govier draws on Johnson and Blair's standard triad. However, she keeps the distinction of
deductive, inductive, and conductive types of arguments (2001, pp. 67-81).
10
Johnson now takes the position that truth is also needed to adequately evaluate arguments (2000, pp. 195-198).
He also incorporates a dialectical tier, which is the second part of an argument that handles objections, alternative
positions, criticisms and challenges (2000, pp. 206-209).
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dependence and language invariance must further collect evidence from different language
communities in order to demonstrate that differences in native language can affect how
arguments are structured. Since Kaplan himself does not advance a strong claim in his article, the
onus is on anyone who wants to defend Kaplan's point of view to argue that his point is more than
just a conjecture. Point 3 also requires further research, for Kaplan, Okabe and Oi are all geared
toward the description of differences of thought patterns and discourse structure but not toward
the evaluation of arguments. Although I have suggested that point 3 may be the case, my point
could be wrong. If my point is correct, and we must be sensitive about the linguistic background
of the arguer, then we are not sure about how much sensitivity is needed, and how the sensitivity
affects the overall evaluation of the argument.
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